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OPINION OF THE COURT

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
This case arises from Appellant James L. Bowley’s arrest
for allegedly raping a minor while a minor himself, and the
subsequent truthful publication of the fact of that arrest by
Appellee Uniontown Herald Standard.

As a result of the

publication, Bowley sued the Herald Standard for a violation of the
Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the disclosure of juvenile law
enforcement records and for the tort of invasion of privacy. We
must now decide whether imposition of civil liability upon the
Herald Standard for its actions with regard to Bowley would be
consistent with the First Amendment. The District Court held that
2

it would not and granted the Herald Standard’s motion to dismiss.
Because we agree that under these facts, the First Amendment
provides the Herald Standard with a shield from liability, we will
affirm.
I.
The Herald Standard published an article reporting that
Bowley, a minor, had been arrested for allegedly raping a sevenyear-old girl he was babysitting. In its entirety, the article stated:
City police arrested James Landon Bowley,
15, of Farmington Sunday on charges he allegedly
raped a 7-year-old girl he was babysitting at her
Uniontown home Friday evening.
According to police, the girl’s mother took
her daughter to Uniontown Hospital after the girl
complained of injury and bleeding Sunday afternoon.
Bowley turned himself in to police Sunday at
5:45 p.m. and was charged with two counts of rape
and one count each of indecent assault, involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse and indecent exposure.
Charges against Bowley were filed at the
Connellsville Juvenile Detention Facility, where he
is being held, police said.1
(App. at 30a). According to Bowley, the Herald Standard received
the information concerning his arrest from Uniontown Police
Officer Fred Balsley.

1

Although unclear from the record, it does not appear that
Bowley was actually prosecuted.
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After seeing the report of his arrest in the newspaper,
Bowley brought suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette
County, Pennsylvania against the Herald Standard, the City of
Uniontown, the City of Uniontown Police Department, and
Balsley.2 He alleged that the release of the fact and details of his
arrest to the Herald Standard, and the subsequent publication of
that information by the Herald Standard, violated his rights under
both state and federal law. Against the Herald Standard, Bowley
brought claims for breach of confidentiality in violation of 42 P A.
C ONS. S TAT. § 6308, which generally prohibits the disclosure of
juvenile law enforcement records, and for the tort of invasion of
privacy. Against all other Defendants, Bowley brought these statelaw claims in addition to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violation of his civil rights.
Because there was a federal claim, Defendants removed the
case to the Western District of Pennsylvania. The Herald Standard
then filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The
District Court, relying on the Report and Recommendation from

2

At the time the case was filed, Bowley, born on November
17, 1985, was a minor. Thus, he brought the case through James
C. Bowley, his father and guardian ad litem.
4

the Magistrate Judge, granted that motion. Because Bowley has
since settled with the remaining Defendants and stipulated to a
voluntary dismissal of his claims against them, the District Court’s
grant of the motion to dismiss is a final order, which we have
jurisdiction to review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
We exercise plenary review over the grant of a motion to
dismiss. Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1411 (3d Cir. 1993).
We must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint
and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Id. Only if it is certain that no relief could be
granted under the facts pleaded may we affirm. Id.
III.
As explained, Bowley has stated two claims against the
Herald Standard, each stemming from the publication of
information concerning his arrest. He first claims a breach of
confidentiality in violation of 42 P A. C ONS. S TAT. § 6308.3 He

3

Section 6308 of Pennsylvania’s Judicial Code provides in
relevant part:
The contents of law enforcement records and files
concerning a child shall not be disclosed to the
5

also claims a tortious invasion of his privacy. The Herald
Standard argues that the breach of confidentiality claim is not
cognizable under Pennsylvania law and that Bowley cannot
establish each element of the invasion of privacy claim. It
argues in addition, that the First Amendment shields it from civil
liability for publishing the article, which contained truthful
information received from the police. We agree with the Herald
Standard that the First Amendment shields it from liability on
these facts.4
There no doubt exists a tension between the First
Amendment right to a free press and an individual’s statutory
and common law right to privacy, complicated here because the
individual in question is a juvenile. It is a tension the Supreme
Court has had several occasions to address. See Florida Star v.

public except if the child is 14 or more years of age
at the time of the alleged conduct and if any of the
following apply:
(i) The child has been adjudicated delinquent by a
court . . . [or]
(ii) A petition alleging delinquency has been filed by
a law enforcement agency . . .
4

For that reason we need resolve the questions of state law
before us. In particular, we need not decide whether 42 P A. C ONS.
S TAT. § 6308 creates a cause of action under Pennsylvania law.
6

B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g, 443
U.S. 97 (1979); Oklahoma Publ’g Co. v. Oklahoma County Dist.
Ct., 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469 (1975). While the Court has upheld a newspaper’s right to
publish in each of these cases, it has been careful to decide each
upon its discrete facts, Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 530, and has
declined to hold that publication of truthful information is per se
protected by the First Amendment, id. at 532. Nevertheless, the
Court has made clear that as a general matter, “state action to
punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy
constitutional standards.” Daily Mail Publ’g, 443 U.S. at 102.
In fact, it has held that “‘if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful
information about a matter of public significance then state
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the
information, absent a need to further a state interest of the
highest order.’” Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533 (quoting Daily
Mail Publ’g, 443 U.S. at 103). A newspaper, moreover, may be
punished consistent with the Constitution only when the
punishment is narrowly tailored to serve the purported state
interest. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541. Thus, in order to

7

determine whether the First Amendment permits the imposition
of civil liability upon the Herald Standard for publishing the
article concerning Bowley’s arrest, we must consider: (A)
whether the information was truthful and lawfully obtained; (B)
whether the information concerned a matter of public
significance; and (C) whether the imposition of liability would
be the most narrowly tailored way to serve a state interest of the
highest order.
Although the truthfulness of the article is not in dispute,
the parties disagree as to whether other aspects of this test have
been satisfied. They disagree as to whether the Herald Standard
lawfully obtained information concerning Bowley’s arrest. They
disagree as to whether Bowley’s arrest is a matter of public
significance. And they disagree, finally, as to whether protecting
the anonymity of an arrested juvenile is a need of the “highest
order.” We address each of these disputes in turn.
A.
Bowley contends that absent discovery, it is unclear
whether the Herald Standard lawfully obtained the information
in the article. Thus, he asserts, the case should be remanded. In

8

light of the allegations in the Complaint, however, Bowley can
prove no set of facts establishing that the Herald Standard
obtained the information unlawfully.
According to the Complaint, Officer Balsley informed the
Herald Standard of Bowley’s arrest. (App. at 13a). Although
Balsley violated Pennsylvania law prohibiting the release of
juvenile arrest records by doing so, see 42 P A. C ONS. S TAT. §
6308, his unlawful release of the information does not make
receipt of that information by the Herald Standard unlawful.
Section 6308 prohibits only the disclosure of juvenile law
enforcement information, not the receipt of such information.5
See id. (“The contents of law enforcement records and files
concerning a child shall not be disclosed to the public. . . .”)
(emphasis added); cf. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 536 (“Even
assuming the Constitution permitted a State to proscribe receipt
of information, Florida has not taken this step. . . .”).
Moreover, the Supreme Court held in Florida Star that

5

For the purposes of the First Amendment, whether the
Herald Standard’s subsequent disclosure of the information
violated section 6308 is irrelevant to the question of whether the
newspaper lawfully obtained the information it disclosed.
9

failure by the police to comply with a Florida statute prohibiting
the release of a rape victim’s name did not render unlawful a
newspaper’s resultant receipt of the protected information. 491
U.S. at 536. The Court explained, “[n]or does the fact that the
Department apparently failed to fulfill its obligation under . . .
[the non-disclosure statute] make the newspaper’s ensuing
receipt of this information unlawful.” Id. The Court reiterated
this sentiment in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001),
holding: “a stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to remove
the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public
concern.” Similarly in the case before us, Balsley’s failure to
comply with section 6308 does not render the Herald Standard’s
subsequent receipt of the information unlawful. Bowley,
therefore, cannot prove that the Herald Standard unlawfully
obtained the information at issue under the facts alleged.
B.
The fact of Bowley’s arrest is a matter of public concern.6
6

We recognize, however, that there might be cases where
the details of the crime, as opposed to its mere occurrence, would
not necessarily be of public concern. See e.g., Foretich v. Lifetime
Cable, 777 F. Supp. 47, 50 (D.D.C. 1991) (“The Court
acknowledges that the sexual abuse of children is an issue worthy
of public attention, but it does not believe as a matter of law, that
10

In Florida Star, the Supreme Court held that the commission and
investigation of violent crimes—in that case like in this one,
rape—are matters of “paramount public import.” 491 U.S. at
536–37; accord Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
492 (1975) (“The commission of crime, prosecutions from it,
and judicial proceedings arising from the prosecutions . . . are
without question events of legitimate concern to the public. . .
.”). The rape of a minor is a crime of violence. Bowley’s arrest
for allegedly committing that crime is within the realm of
legitimate public concern.7 Although this case is somewhat
complicated by the fact that the alleged offender was himself a
minor, we think the legitimacy of public concern regarding the
rape of a minor cannot seriously be doubted, regardless of the

the specific facts about the alleged abuse of this one particular
child [ ] as described by the child on the videotape in question are
of legitimate public concern.”).
7

Incidentally, it is for this reason that Bowley’s claim for
invasion of privacy fails. Although the tort of invasion of privacy
is actually four distinct torts, only one is presently at issue: publicity
given to private life. Under Pennsylvania law, the elements of this tort
are: 1) giving publicity; 2) to private facts; 3) of a kind highly offensive
to a reasonable person; and 4) which are not of legitimate concern to the
public. Jenkins v. Bolla, 600 A.2d 1293, 1296 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(emphasis added). As explained in the text, Bowley’s arrest is of
legitimate public concern. Thus, he cannot establish the elements of his
invasion of privacy claim.
11

age of the accused.
C.
Because the information published by the Herald
Standard was truthful, lawfully obtained, and concerning a
matter of public significance, the First Amendment shields the
Herald Standard from civil liability unless the imposition of
liability is narrowly tailored to serve an interest of the highest
order. Even if, as Bowley asserts, protecting the anonymity of
an arrested juvenile is an interest of the highest order, under the
facts of this case, we hold that subjecting the Herald Standard to
civil liability is not the most narrowly tailored means of serving
that interest.
The Supreme Court has held that when the government
itself inappropriately releases otherwise-confidential information
“the imposition of damages against the press for its subsequent
publication can hardly be said to be a narrowly tailored means of
safeguarding anonymity.” 8 Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 538.
Indeed, when the government has stewardship over confidential

8

The anonymity to be protected in that case was that of a
rape victim. However, the same rationale applies with equal force
to the anonymity of the alleged offender.
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information, not releasing the information to the media in the
first place will more narrowly serve the interest of preserving
confidentiality than will punishing the publication of the
information once inappropriately released. See id. Because it is
alleged in the Complaint, we assume that Balsley, a government
employee, provided the Herald Standard with the information in
the article, in violation of section 6308's non-disclosure
requirement. Accordingly, imposing civil liability upon the
Herald Standard is not the most narrowly tailored way to protect
Bowley’s anonymity. Rather, it would have been far less drastic
for Balsley to have simply not disclosed the information.
D.
A newspaper may not be held liable for its publication of
lawfully obtained, truthful information on a matter of public
significance unless imposing liability would be the most
narrowly tailored means of serving a state interest of the highest
order. Id. at 541. The information contained in the article
published by the Herald Standard was truthful, lawfully
obtained, and concerned a matter of public significance. We
need not decide whether protecting the anonymity of juvenile
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offenders is a state interest of the highest order, because when
the government is ultimately responsible for the disclosure of
information, imposing civil liability upon a newspaper for the
subsequent publication of that information is not the most
narrowly tailored means of serving any purported interest.
Bowley, therefore, cannot seek civil damages against the Herald
Standard consistent with the First Amendment. He must instead
rest his hopes for restitution “upon the willingness of the
government to compensate victims for their loss of privacy”
stemming from the government’s inappropriate release of
confidential information. Id. at 538.
IV.
Bowley cannot maintain his action against the Herald
Standard consistent with the First Amendment. We will affirm
the District Court’s grant of the Herald Standard’s motion to
dismiss.
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